Chang does what few free-market sorts of economists like to do, which is to pull out a bunch of data—and for that matter, data of a more basic and important kind, and not the stretched inferential reaches toward the trivial that certain pop contrarians (Christ, I reviewed that one way too charitably) prefer—and use it to point out the flamingly obvious counterexamples to free-market thinking, most of it from the past thirty or forty years, and demonstrate the points he's arguing. While judicious data-comparing is an interesting exercise and all, if you're making an economic argument, it's good of him to try and evaluate what actually matters. There's a *reason* that libertarians prefer to present everything as a counterintuitive thought experiment.
He makes these comparisons with as valid a scope as he can. For example, he compares growth during respective nation's own respective development phases, which may be separated by a century or two, and while this is not perfect, it's better than comparing, say, the U.S. in 2010 to Burkina Faso of the same year. When looking at major effects of free market policies, he compares the results before and after implementation (which is what confines his history to the last four decades), and between countries that did or did not implement them. From this, there evolves some general principles and observations: all large economies are (imperfectly) planned; manufacturing is still far more important than finance (and successful economies became that way by protecting and fostering industry); free-market economic policies have resulted in lower growth, higher instability, and greater inequality in the countries where they've been willingly adopted or forced; that separating managers and owners from negative economic impacts has been a disaster.
This isn't to say that Chang has got it all covered perfectly. In some cases, I see the faults as only matters of understated emphasis, a failure to really push his conclusions right through the wall. For example, like most people, Chang imagines a distinction between state and capital. He takes care to reduce the clarity of distinction, saying that governments do in fact guide industries, that capital really has a national character (although labor, he says, not so much), and that corporate planning isn't a special category from government planning, but look, if you're going to take a long historical view of this, especially if you're going to cite examples of what made countries like the U.S., Britain, or the Soviet Union developed in the first place (and how they did so differently than African, Asian, or South American nations in their own twentieth century growth steps), then it's relevant that these economies owe a lot of their wealth to conquest and exploitation as well as development. A great deal of their governmental planning activities went to support the horrible crony industries of the day, such as enslavement, theft of gold, abuse of immigrants, and colonialism. There was a little more involved than tariffs, subsidies, and putting the screws on immigration. When it comes to failures of investment, did the Soviet Union pick badly, and in the sense of its constituents, immorally, to develop its military and space program at the expense of other industries? Yeah, almost certainly it did. But how do we in the U.S. do with choosing our core companies above all else? That is, it ain't just our financial sector that's pushing people around and diverting from more wholesome ends. Now, I don't think any of the above is *inconsistent* with anything Chang writes, and he does go further than most to fuzz up the boundaries between economic and other human activity or motivations, but having raised these points, he could have taken them home.
My second criticism is that Chang ignores arguments of scale, and some of the basic challenges to measuring things by growth. [Why, it's another of my hobby horses he's somehow refusing to recognize! The nerve!] Using growth as an important variable of success tempts fallacies of large and small numbers, and can ignore some important external factors. If, say, Congo grew more rapidly in the 60s, or western Europe in the early 50s, then you might want to consider the starting points. (On the other hand, industrially awakened America and Asia are probably excellent comparison points.) Likewise, we can make the same point for contemporary America's condition, which sane people might expect to saturate and decline at some point thanks to fundamental issues with resource-intense growth models, or even just running out of markets to expand to, even without considering the drain of the financial bubbles. I mean, I agree with Chang about the negative effects of the financialization of the west and the IMFification of the third world, and again, his counterexamples are well-chosen, a few of the modern ones that didn't rely as much on a massive army to make them work (Chang is Korean, and in a good position to question what the fuck the bank nations are always talking about), but growth models also have inherent problems of their own.
Finally, the only other thing I wish that Chang had done differently was to modify the way he introduced his chapters. I'm fine with the division and structure of the book, but each "what they tell you" section, meant to evoke a common free market argument, is a way to invite problems. I think that most of them are presented in good faith, but they're still straw men. And they don't need to be: it would not have been difficult to precede these paragraphs with a real quote to pin the view on an actual right-wing or neoliberal luminary. Two hours picking through transcripts of Larry Kudlow, Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, etc. could have given him more than enough material.
And if they didn't fit into a general review, here are a few points that captured my interest enough to write down:
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